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“I have often been struck by the prevailing view in Community circles that the worst 
that can happen is any movement towards what is called and Europe à la carte. This is 
not only  somewhat odd for someone who likes to make his own choices, but also 
illustrates that strange Puritanism, not to say masochism, which underlies much of 
Community action: Europe has to hurt in order to be good.”  
Ralf Dahrendorf 1979 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Today, in times of institutional crisis following the French and Dutch rejection of a 
constitutional treaty, in times of economic stagnation following the Lisbon agenda’s 
failure to deliver results, and in times of growing uncertainty about the identity and 
limits of Europe, Lord Dahrendorf’s statement seems no less relevant than it may have 
been in the times of widely felt “Eurosclerosis”. The recent enlargement of the EU, even 
if it was hardly greeted with great enthusiasm by European citizens, has a potential to 
bring a new dynamic to the European common market. At the same time, the EU-wide 
acquis communautaire menu of uniform laws and regulations is today even more likely 
to cause “indigestion” as its has been expanded to an almost “unswallowable” amount 
of pages, which are “served” to 25 member states regardless of their “gusto” and 
regardless whether they have actually “ordered” what they are “dished up” or whether 
they were overruled when the present “chefs” composed the menu by qualified majority 
vote or via log-rolling behind closed doors. We believe that this “one-size-fits-all” 
philosophy has been taken too far already and is not sustainable in the future. The 
agents of European politics ought to devote much more time and energy during the self-
imposed “period of reflection” to also discuss various forms of flexible integration and 
enlargement.  
 
The recent enlargement of the European Union has added significantly to the 
heterogeneity of EU membership. This rise in diversity increases both (i) “decision-
making costs” and (ii) “external costs”, that is to say, the costs a citizen has to bear in 
case his preferred decision is not the one reached by the EU (Buchanan/Tullock 1962). 
Thus, since a more diverse EU makes it all the more difficult and costly to jointly 
develop policy, the Union’s future will depend on its capacity to cope with 
disagreement owing to divergent national socio-economic capabilities and preferences. 
Against this background, the essential question is: How can a more flexible, 
economically efficient and politically feasible mode of integration be put into operation 
that is compatible with the heterogeneity of economic structures as well as political, 
social and cultural preferences throughout the EU?  
 
Our paper proceeds as follows: As a point of departure, part two highlights the 
heterogeneity among EU member states following the recent enlargement, while part 
three reviews three main alternative conceptions of flexible integration as they were 
discussed in political circles. Part four applies Buchanan’s and Tullock’s Calculus of 
Consent (1962) to the tension between deepening and widening the EU. Part five 
introduces basic elements of the economic theory of clubs, analyzes the notion of the 
EU as a club and examines flexible integration in a club-theoretical framework. Part six 
considers several alternative integration models in view of the conclusions of both club 
theory and constitutional economics, while part seven focuses more specifically on a 
club-of-clubs approach that we tend to favour as an ideal-type model for a European 
Union of the future. Part eight evaluates the relative weaknesses and strengths of 
flexible integration according to the club-of-clubs approach and part nine advocates 
some further institutional recommendations before part ten concludes.    2
2.   A Larger and More Heterogeneous Union and the Need for 
Flexibility 
 
The European Union is performing regulatory functions in ever wider policy fields in 
ever more member states. The recently enlarged EU of 25 countries and almost 500 
million people will expand even further when Bulgaria and Romania and probably 
Croatia and possibly Turkey join. The structural indicators shown in table 1 (see 
appendix) give a sense of the increase in economic heterogeneity as a result of the 2004 
enlargement and display the diversity of the recently admitted Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) relative to the countries of the former EU-15. The first 
feature to emerge from the table is the wide income dispersion and the gap in economic 
development between the EU-15 and the CEECs. Moreover, the table displays very 
large unemployment figures in some of the CEECs and illustrates that inflation rates are 
higher among the CEECs than among the former EU-15 countries. In addition, the 
economic structures differ significantly (on average, the relative importance of the 
CEEC’s agricultural sector is more than three times higher than within the EU-15).  
 
To be sure, heterogeneity as such is not a problem; to the contrary, with respect to the 
Internal Market it creates benefits, for example through a more efficient division of 
labour.
1 On the other hand, more diverse EU membership will make it all the more 
difficult and costly to develop policies aimed at specific common purposes. The 
growing heterogeneity not only with respect to economic structure and performance but 
also with respect to political objectives, social needs, cultural preferences and financial 
constraints and the fact that the willingness as well as the capacity of individual EU 
member states to participate in accomplishing integration varies greatly, causes more 
flexible integration to be almost unavoidable.
2  
 
3.  Political Concepts of Flexible Integration  
 
The discussion of flexible integration is far from novel; various modes of flexible 
integration have gained considerable prominence in the political debate. Although each 
of the proposed models conveys a series of often subtle distinctions and implies 
different strategies for action, all stem from a similar diagnosis of the EU’s malady: 
namely, that of seeking to apply excessively and unrealistically strict common goals and 
disciplines to countries which in fact are strikingly diverse in terms of both political-
economic preferences and capabilities.  
 
According to the terminology used in the context of European integration, flexibility, 
sometimes used interchangeably with the expression differentiation,  constitutes the 
general term for the possibility of member states to have different rights and obligations 
with respect to certain common policy areas and refers to the possibility of the 
temporary or permanent existence of different levels of integration within the EU. This 
section briefly outlines three main categories of flexible integration, 1. multi-speed, 2. 
                                                 
1 In addition, some new member states, fuelled by radical pro-market, low-tax reforms were able to 
generate remarkable growth and to lay the foundations of fiscal stability and sound social security 
systems that may in the longer run outperform some overregulated sclerotic states in “old Europe”. 
2 Alternative methods to accommodate the increased diversity will presumably not do; for instance, 
buying off recalcitrant member states or eliminating diversity through assistance programs can be 
expected to soon expose the limits of budgetary solidarity.   3
concentric circles and 3. à la carte integration, and seeks to disentangle these generally 




3.1 Multi-Speed Europe 
Already in the context of the first enlargement of the European Community and the 
introduction of transition phases of adjustment in 1973, Willy Brandt spawned a greater 
discussion about a two-speed Europe in 1974, followed by the Tindemans Report in 
1975 with further proposals for differentiated development. Models of multi-speed 
integration can be defined as modes of integration whereby the pursuit of common 
objectives is driven by a group of member states which are both capable and willing of 
progressing at a higher pace towards deeper integration in certain policy areas, while the 
remaining member states are obliged to follow according to specific criteria as soon as 
they can (Stubb 1996: 287). In other words, the multi-speed approach clearly preserves 
the fundamental idea that there should be a common level of integration and that 
exemptions from it are temporary and exceptional. As ultimate objectives remain 
common to all members, it adds flexibility only in the implementation stage. Since 
multi-speed models do not allow some countries to opt for a deeper level of integration 
and others to be exempted from it, they fail to deal with the underlying logic and the 
fundamental reason of the drive for flexibility: the existence of difference.  
 
3.2 Europe of Concentric Circles 
The concentric circles or Kerneuropa approach, has gained substantial prominence in 
the political debate during the recent past. Eduard Balladur, as France’s prime minister, 
was the first to raise the idea of a Europe of concentric circles in 1994. Shortly 
afterwards, the “Schäuble-Lamers-Paper” (1994) made a similar proposal in greater 
detail.
4 Moreover, the concentric circles model of integration is the basis of the notion 
of forming avant-garde or pioneer groups that has been favoured by Joschka Fischer, 
Jacques Delors and Jacques Chirac in 2000 and was again put forward (in an attempt to 
isolate Tony Blair) by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder in December 2003.
 In the 
concentric circles concept, a highly integrated hard core consisting of member states 
cooperating on an extensive range of activities, say economic, monetary and political 
union, is pictured to be surrounded by numerous rings of ever less integrated groups of 
countries. In contrast to multi-speed models, the approach of a Europe of concentric 
circles admits unattainable differences by allowing permanent separation between the 
hard core and lesser developed integrative units (Stubb 1996: 287). 
 
3.3 Europe à la Carte 
Integration à la carte, termed by Dahrendorf (1979), admits member states to freely pick 
and choose, as from a menu, in which policy area they would like to participate and co-
operate more closely, while at the same time holding only to a minimum number of 
common objectives (Stubb 1996: 288).
5 À la carte models, like the concentric circles 
models, envisage the possibility of permanent division, but do so by allowing member 
states to opt out and opt in with respect to individual policies rather than according to a 
                                                 
3 The use of terms like “variable geometry” or “multi-speed” is neither precise nor consistent. As Stubb 
(1996: 283) puts it, the debate about flexible integration, “is characterized by an excess of terminology 
which can give even the most experienced specialist of European integration a severe case of semantic 
indigestion”.  
4 The “Schäuble-Lamers-Paper”, published in 1994 and revised in 1999, proposed that the Union’s 
“existing hard core” of five countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) 
should press on quickly towards closer co-ordination of monetary, fiscal, industrial and social policies. 
5 As Dahrendorf (1979: 29) puts it: “Europe à la carte, that is common policies where there are common 
interests without any constraint on those who cannot, at any given point in time, join them, must become 
the rule rather than the exception”.   4
predetermined package corresponding to membership of a given geographical 
“division” of the Union into a hard core and surrounding peripheries (Warleigh 2002: 
79). Thus, the à la carte concept is functional rather than geographical and, in contrast to 
the concentric circles approach, the focus is on policies, not on countries. 
 
4. Deepening versus Widening    
 
Many scholars tend to be pessimistic about the possibility of reconciling the aims of 
widening and deepening the EU arguing that “widening the EU will require current 
members to abandon efforts to further deepen integration, while further deepening will 
be possible only at the expense of further enlargement” (Brewster et al. 2002: 49). By 
applying the “constitutional calculus”, developed by James M. Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock in their Public-Choice classic The Calculus of Consent (1962) to decision-
making in the Council of Minister and the European Commission, we now want to shed 
some more light on this tension. 
  
The “constitutional calculus” weighing up (1) the risk of political measures not being 
undertaken that would, in fact, serve the common interest of all citizens, and (2) the risk 
of political measures being undertaken that run against the interest of part or all of the 
citizenry, is what Buchanan and Tullock have described as the “logical basis of 
constitutional democracy”. By distinguishing between (i) decision-making costs and (ii) 
external costs, Buchanan and Tullock provide a helpful tool to further analyze the 
“constitutional calculus”. (i) Decision-making costs, on the one hand, are the “costs 
which the individual expects to incur as a result of his own participation in an organized 
activity” (Buchanan/Tullock 1962: 45), that is, the costs of making a decision that is 
desired. (ii) External costs, on the other hand, are “the costs that the individual expects 
to endure as a result of the actions of others over which he has no direct control” (ibid: 
45), namely the costs of bearing the consequences of a decision, which was not desired, 
that is, the costs of being forced to comply with legislation that one opposes. Buchanan 
and Tullock call the sum of these costs the cost of social interdependence, or, for a 
shorter term, interdependence costs, and argue that the minimization of these overall 
costs of collective choice is a suitable goal for social or political organizations
 (ibid: 46).  
 
Applying these considerations to the EU yields the following conclusions regarding the 
consequences of a larger and more heterogeneous EU (Streit/Voigt 1995: 19; Brewster 
et al. 2002: 50ff): (i) For any given collective choice rule, for example qualified 
majority voting, decision-making costs will be higher in units with a more 
heterogeneous population than in those with a more homogenous one: enlargement will 
raise the costs of decision-making in the EU by increasing the number and 
heterogeneity of member states. (ii) Moreover, for any given collective choice rule, 
external costs will also be higher in more heterogeneous units than in more 
homogeneous ones, for instance, owing to a larger number of people having to live with 
a centralized decision made on the EU-level of policy-making which does not comply 
with their order of preferences. As a result, given that every additional member makes 
the EU more heterogeneous, each entrant causes both decision-making and external 
costs to increase (ibid: 115). Hence, there is a trade-off between decision-making and 
external costs:  
 
(i)  Since decision-making costs rise with more heterogeneous membership, 
given a maximum level of tolerable decision-making costs, increased 
heterogeneity should be accompanied by less  inclusive decision-rules to 
counterbalance the higher decision-making costs owing to more   5
heterogeneous EU-membership (see Fig. 1). In fact, in the Constitutional 
Treaty draft, for about 26 decision-making areas, unanimity voting in the 
Council has been changed to qualified majority voting in terms of both 
member states and citizens. However, decision-making costs are not the only 
relevant cost category: external costs will increase as a result of a less 
inclusive decision-rule. Thus, from the viewpoint of external costs we again 
arrive at a dilemma, since: 
(ii)  External costs also increase with more heterogeneous membership. 
Accordingly, if we assume that a randomly chosen individual in the EU will 
accept only some maximum level of external costs, increasing the 
heterogeneity of EU membership should, from the perspective of external 
costs, be complemented by more inclusive decision-rules (see Fig. 2). These, 
in turn, will increase decision-making costs. Thus, there is a trade-off 
between decision-making and external costs: the reduction of one of these 






In light of this trade-off, it becomes obvious that abandoning the unanimity rule in 
favour of a qualified majority decision rule in the Council does not only decrease 
decision-making costs, as the political debate has emphasized, but simultaneously 
raises external costs, which in turn potentially threatens the acceptability of the Union, 
with its declared aim to be “closer to the citizens”. Thus, the increase in heterogeneity 
generates an ambivalent result with respect to a potential change in decision-rules. 
Depending on the actual functions describing external and decision-making costs, their 
aggregation as interdependence costs, might either suggest a less inclusive (see Fig.3) 
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But one result can be said to hold in any case: Given a certain decision-making rule, the 
more heterogeneous the European Union, the larger are decision-making costs and 
external costs. Increased heterogeneity therefore always leads to an increase in 
interdependence costs no matter how the actual functions look like. From this 
perspective, the EU appears to be “too big”, (i) in terms of too many members having to 
agree on certain policies causing decision-making costs to be very high and (ii) in terms 
of too many harmonized policy fields resulting in a potential for high external cost due 
to the large number of individuals having to obey collective decisions. This implies that 
all constitutional provisions should be welcomed that reduce one type of cost without 
increasing the other, or that bring the two costs in a more favourable balance, as judged 
by the citizens. 
 
Thus, the fundamental question to be discussed, when analyzing the problematic tension 
between deepening and widening, is the following: Can the rules of the game be altered 
such that a new reasonable trade-off between external and decision-making costs can 
be generated and both costs are brought into what the citizens themselves consider to 
be the most favourable balance? Or, to put it differently: How could one enhance the 
compatibility of the recent enlargement with further integration? The remainder of this 
paper attempts to develop an answer to this question. 
 
5. The Theory of Clubs and the EU as Political Multi-Purpose Club 
 
5.1 Club Theory and Club Goods 
The evidence of de facto club creation in Europe during the last twenty years as well as 
the introduction of provisions for “enhanced cooperation” into the European Treaties 
indicate that the application of club theory to EU integration can yield fruitful insights 
into the mechanics of further integration of the Union. The economic analysis of club 
formation started with the contribution of James M. Buchanan (1965). His seminal 
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Since then Buchanan’s club theory has been applied to several economic and political 
issues such as community size, production of local public goods or political coalitions.
6  
While Buchanan focused on one club good only, more recent approaches analyze clubs 
that produce multiple goods.
7 Moreover, club theory has been applied to international 
issues and international organizations such as the EU
8.  
 
As a simple definition, clubs are voluntary groups formed by individuals to pursue a 
common goal – the provision of a club good. Originally, the theory of clubs was meant 
to overcome Samuelson’s dichotomy between pure public and pure private goods with 
club goods ranging somewhere in between (Buchanan 1965: 1f). Accordingly, club 
goods display two defining attributes (ibid: 2ff): (i) they are non-rival (or only partially 
rival, i.e. non-rival up to a certain number of members) in their consumption to club 
members, that is, if one member benefits this does not reduce the benefits going to other 
members; (ii) the benefits of club goods cannot be enjoyed by non-members, i.e. 
exclusion is possible. As a result, club members are required to fund the production of 
such goods in order to enjoy these benefits. The excludable attribute of club goods 
prevents free-riding; if a member does not pay his dues, that member can be deprived of 
the benefits of club membership.  
 
The purpose of inquiry of the theory of clubs is to identify the optimal level of club 
goods to be produced and the optimal number of club members. The optimal club size is 
reached when marginal benefits for the club members from accepting an additional 
member are just equal to the marginal costs that are incurred from adding one more 
member to the club (Buchanan 1965: 5). Traditional club theory often assumes partial 
rivalry of club good benefits implying that a large number of members will result in 
“crowding” or “congestion” effects reducing the quality of the goods and services 
provided by the club. Moreover, traditional club theory assumes that per capita costs of 
producing the club good decrease with an increase in the number of club members 
because provision expenses associated with the club good,  assumed to be independent 
of club size, will be shared among more members. It remains to be discussed whether 
these assumptions, certainly appropriate in the case of swimming pools or golf clubs, 
will also be adequate in the context of European club goods.  
 
5.2 The EU as a Club Providing Multiple Integration Club Goods 
Further insights into the club notion can be gained by examining the legal rules for 
private clubs, for example golf clubs (Blankart 1994). In the case of private clubs, only 
two restrictions have to be observed by law (see for example §§ 27 and 28 BGB):  
 
(1) Every member must have the right of leaving the club.  
(2) The power granted to the board of the club must not be irrevocable.  
 
In analogy to private clubs, jurisdictions can be viewed as clubs providing club goods to 
their citizens.
9 The idea that the EU and other international trade, monetary and defence 
                                                 
6 The literature on club theory has been surveyed by Sandler/Tschirhart (1980), Cornes/Sandler (1996) 
and Sandler/Tschirhart (1997). 
7 E.g. Brueckner/Lee (1991), Sandler/Tschirhart (1993) and Cornes/Sandler (1996: 404ff). 
8 E.g. Padoan (2001), Sell (2000), Fratianni (2003), Ohr (2003), Ahren/Hoen/Ohr (2005). 
9 When the constitutional economics literature refers to democratic jurisdictions as “clubs”, this does not 
imply that this comparison disregards that membership in a jurisdiction cannot be viewed as equally 
“voluntary” as in typical private clubs, e.g. tennis clubs. Rather, the comparison is intended to point to the 
fact that jurisdictions are, similar to private clubs, producers of club goods and that the exit option, like in 
private clubs, plays an important role in ensuring the protection of the jurisdiction member’s interests. 
However, in contrast to typical private clubs, states are organised intergenerationally and territorially. For 
a discussion of the main differences between membership in a state, on the one hand, and in a voluntary 
private club, on the other hand, see for example Vanberg (2003a: 14f).   8
arrangements can be conceived as such a club almost suggests itself. But before we can 
proceed to applying club theory to the European Union, the following questions have to 
be confronted: (1.) Who are the members of the EU club? (2.) What are the club goods 
produced? (3.) What type of costs are incurred in providing them, what type of benefits 
in consuming them and what can be said about optimal club size? 
 
5.2.1 European Club Members  
In what follows, this paper conceives the EU to be a club of states, not of individuals. 
Conceived in this manner, the EU club currently consists of 25 members. This is not 
meant to disregard the fact that states are formed by individuals and that governments 
are simply agents of their population, the principal. If we assume the EU member states’ 
national constitutions to be principal-agent-contracts, the EU club could also be 
conceived as a club comprising ca. 500 Million members who are represented by 25 
agents, i.e. the governments of 25 member states. While bearing this in mind, the 
remainder of this paper will refer to the EU club consisting of 25 member states.
  
 
5.2.2 European Club Goods  
The following examples of European club goods demonstrate that the EU can indeed be 
conceived as a club that provides a variety of club goods to its members: Club goods 
provided by the EU include the guarantee of the “Four Freedoms”, i.e. the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital through the Internal Market; a single 
currency through membership in the EMU; external and internal security through a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and police and judicial collaboration in 
criminal affairs. Further examples of European club goods are the definition of 
environmental and product standards securing consumer protection, the Schengen 
Agreement and Convention and the Western European Union (WEU).
10 Additionally, 
stronger coordination in social, employment, industrial and education policies has been 
put on the European agenda striving for EU-wide harmonized standards and centrally 
provided policy instruments. All of the above goods have in common that they are (i) 
non-rival (or only partially rival) in consumption and (ii) that non-subscribers to the 
respective agreements (be that within-EU-treaties or bilateral treaties of third countries 
with the EU) are excluded from their consumption. Therefore these goods qualify as 
club goods. 
  
5.2.3 Club Benefits, Club Costs and Optimal Club Size  
Our basic premise is that integration areas can be conceptually conceived as 
distinguishable clubs. In each of these areas, members participate in the benefits of 
integration but at the same time have to contribute to the costs of financing the 
provision of the relevant integration club goods. As sketched above, the size of an 
integrated area is optimal when the marginal benefits of the admission of a new member 
are just offset by the marginal costs a newly admitted member causes, for instance by 
making decision procedures more cumbersome. In the following passages we briefly 
discuss three remarkably different integration areas of the EU in order to demonstrate in 
which ways both benefits and costs of economic regional integration are contingent on 
the size of the area of integration, i.e. the number of club members. 
   
(i) The Internal Market Club 
                                                 
10 Whether “Common Agricultural Policy” or “access to structural and cohesion funds” can be regarded 
as European-wide public goods, remains controversial in the literature. Streit and Voigt (1995: 13) argue 
that they cannot qualify as club goods because the corresponding funds are used in a redistribute way 
resulting in obvious rivalry in consumption.   9
The European club goods corresponding to the Internal Market include reciprocal 
access to the “peace dividend” of international division of labour and knowledge: the 
absence of impediments to trade, access to a common market, the guarantee of the 
“Four Freedoms” and a set of uniform competition rules. A representative member 
derives benefits from being in the Internal Market club by making use of the “Four 
Freedoms” resulting in static and dynamic efficiency gains due to enhanced allocation 
efficiency. These efficiency gains are larger, the larger the Internal Market is, i.e. the 
more members the Internal Market club has. As already Adam Smith (1776) knew: “the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market”. With respect to the Internal 
Market, there is no direct rivalry in club usage; to the contrary, additional members tend 
to generate economies of scale resulting in even larger efficiency gains (Ohr 2003: 120). 
Moreover, new growth theory suggests that economic integration resulting in intensified 
competition may lead to a permanent increase in the economic growth rate of the area 
through a positive interaction between innovation and integration (Fratianni 1995: 11).  
 
If the EU were only a free trade area, then the determination of the optimal size of the 
European club would be relatively easy: from the perspective of trade theory, the 
optimal size of a trade agreement is the world.
11 Also, if there were no costs associated 
with operating the Internal Market or if the regulatory framework necessary for its 
functioning were independent from the number of member-countries making up the 
Internal Market club, it would follow that the Internal Market should be as large as 
possible. However, trade theory is of limited use in determining the optimal size of the 
Union because the EU is much more than a free trade area.  
 
The costs corresponding to a pure disarmament club or the costs of entry into a 
predefined club consisting of the prohibition of intervention are likely to be low and 
hardly rising with club size; thus average costs will decrease as new members join. 
Respecting and enforcing negative liberty rights of the citizens is barely dependent on 
scarce resources like money and the consent of the citizens or (control) knowledge of 
politicians, as Hayek already argued in 1939 (Hayek 1939/80). But positive regulations 
concerning political integration, which can – at least partly – be useful for the 
functioning of the Internal Market, are a different matter.  
 
With respect to positive regulations such as competition rules, consumer protection 
rules or production standards within the EU, active collective choices are necessary und 
political views and capacities diverge. As a consequence, decision-making costs rise. 
These costs are kept relatively low by delegation to the Commission. However, the 
natural centralization and harmonization drive of a central bureaucracy that is exempt 
from democratic competition can result in increasing external costs as the EU-club 
becomes larger, more heterogeneous and more actively interventionist. A “complete” 
Internal Market à la Brussels, therefore, can have a finite optimal club size.   
 
(ii) The Economic and Monetary Union Club  
The club good corresponding to the EMU club is the single currency.
12 Monetary 
integration yields several benefits and positive welfare effects to club members such as 
reductions of transaction costs and of currency risks which in turn leads to more trade, 
                                                 
11 In addition, the more members the Internal Market club has the stronger would be the incentives for 
non-member to become members; this reasoning also applies to the WTO and other preferential trade 
agreements. However, this is not the case for all kinds of international cooperation clubs: for instance, the 
more states have committed to and signed the Kyoto Protocol, the better for the outside free rider (see 
Wohlgemuth 2003). 
12 Frey (1984: 133) argues that monetary integration corresponds to the notion of club goods because 
money as unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value is an excludable public good 
without rivalry to all members of the monetary union.   10
economies of scale and intensified competition and thus general welfare gains. Hence it 
seems reasonable to assume that each additional member of the common currency club 
will yield benefits for the common currency region. However, the EMU club also 
results in organisation, information and decision-making costs. What is more important, 
EMU members are deprived of an independent monetary and exchange rate policy and 
thereby suffer the loss of two important national economic policy instruments. And the 
more heterogeneous the economic structures of the EMU member countries are, the 
more their economic policy objectives diverge and the more dissimilar the endogenous 
and exogenous economic shocks affecting EMU member states are, the less will the 
common inflation goal, the uniform interest rate policy and the common external 
currency value be consistent with the optimal strategy of the respective individual 
member states (Ohr 2003: 123).
13 As a result, the costs of expanding the currency union 
are higher the more current members the union has and the more heterogeneous these 
member states are. 
 
On the one hand, there is no rivalry in consumption regarding the club good common 
currency; rather, there are economies of scale regarding the utility of EMU membership 
in the case of increasing club size. On the other hand, an increase in club size is likely to 
result in a more than proportional increase in production costs of a stable common 
currency – except if all members were absolutely homogeneous, which is not the case.
14 
In sum, enlargement presents more difficulty for monetary union than for the Internal 
Market. For this reason, the optimal EMU club is expected be to smaller than the 
optimal Internal Market club. 
 
(iii) The Common Agricultural Policy Club  
Absurd and harmful policies like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have an 
optimal club size of zero. There is no economic mutual benefit of a policy that 
deliberately brings about increased consumer prices, overproduction, and administrative 
costs. Due to subsidies and elevated EU-prizes for agricultural products, which are 
comparatively high especially from the viewpoint of the newly admitted CEECs, 
agricultural excess production is likely to increase even more as a consequence of the 
recent enlargement. Because these enormous costs of the CAP are likely to exceed any 
potential particular benefits by far, from the perspective of club theory, the optimal size 
of the CAP club is somewhere between zero (if the abolition of protectionism, privilege 
and waste is argued to be in the general interest) and one (if a large majority of citizens 
in one country wants to satisfy redistributive preferences of a minority, they can be 
allowed to tax themselves accordingly). 
 
5.3. Club Size, Club Intensity, and “Interdependence Costs” 
Based on Buchanan’s (1965) original theory of clubs, several authors have come 
forward with interesting technical models that simultaneously determine optimal club 
size and optimal degree of integration in the European Union.
15 These models arrive at 
the conclusion that different policy clubs would demand different optimal membership 
                                                 
13 The inability to vary the exchange rate represents a cost, which is higher the more unevenly distributed 
the shocks are in the EMU area. Moreover, the more inflation preferences among members states differ, 
the more expensive will be the denial of an autonomous currency policy for each individual country 
which will have to surrender to one common policy for the entire currency club. 
14 Whether the EMU club should be large or small depends on two different views on money (see for 
example Casella/Frey 1992: 644). If money is understood to be primarily legal tender, i.e. as a means of 
payment and accounting standard, then money is a public good and the optimal currency area comprises 
all of the countries in the world. However, if money is understood to be an instrument of price stability 
policy, optimality would require a currency area with only a limited number of members who all have 
similar stability preferences. 
15 See Ohr (2003) but also Buchanan (1965), Cornes/ Sandler (1996) and Ahrens/Hoen (2002).   11
sizes suggesting the formation of various smaller sub-clubs within the EU club to be an 
efficient future integration strategy for the European Union. The optimal club size will 
vary from one club good to another contingent on respective policy fields and degrees 
of integration. In other words, in order to achieve optimality, different policy areas 
would require different membership sizes in order to be able to account for the needs 
and capacities of potential members. Inversely, it follows that one single overall EU-
club providing numerous  club goods to all its members at one single degree of 
integration will be comparably sub-optimal from a theoretical point of view.  
 
Hence, applying the economic theory of clubs to the question of EU integration, one 
might draw the conclusion that the future European integration process can only be 
efficient if it is based on differentiation rather than harmonization: In the case of the EU, 
providing various separable club goods and comprising 25 heterogeneous club members 
having different preferences concerning their provision, it will be welfare-enhancing to 
realize flexible integration and allow for the creation of various smaller sub-clubs within 
the overall EU-club, each with an endogenously determined size. Welfare-enhancing 
allocative and dynamic efficiency gains within the EU can be achieved if one could 
accomplish a certain form of devolution of the “one size fits all” EU-club into several 
smaller EU sub-clubs consisting of comparatively homogenous members, allowing 
members of such sub-club to coordinate their activities pursuing their own preferred 
policies according to their specific needs and capabilities. 
5.3.1 Reducing interdependence costs 
Let us return to question of part four: Can external and decision-making costs in the 
European Union be brought into a more favourable balance in order to better prepare the 
enlarged (and further enlarging) Union to make policy choices and cope with the 
increased tension between widening and deepening? As discussed above, for a given 
decision-making rule, increased heterogeneity of EU-membership leads to an increase 
in interdependence costs, i.e. the sum of (i) decision-making and (ii) external costs, at 
the EU-level of collective choice. From this perspective, and given the way the EU is 
presently organised, the Union appears to be “too big” in terms of too many diverse 
members and in terms of too many decisions taken at the overall EU-level of policy-
making causing interdependence costs to be very high.  
 
If we dismiss the option of reducing EU membership size again, but rather take the 
current number of EU-members as given, the only way to diminish interdependence 
costs seems to be to reduce the number of club goods provided by the EU on a once-
and-for-all basis. This seems promising because every increase in interdependence costs 
on the EU-level of policy-making can be expected to make the provision of the club 
good under consideration comparatively less costly on the level of a smaller and more 
homogeneous sub-club than on the level of the overall heterogeneous EU-club: The 
more homogenous membership of the various smaller sub-clubs decreases (i) decision-
making costs as well as (ii) external costs (see Fig. 5).    12
 
 
5.3.2 Optimal Allocation of Competencies 
The question of an optimal European club size and the issue of allocating political 
competencies to different levels of decision-making within the EU can also be 
approached from a slightly different point of view. As Buchanan and Tullock argue, in 
order to achieve the optimal size of a jurisdiction, “[t]he group should be extended as 
long as the expected costs of the spillover effects from excluded jurisdictions exceed the 
incremental costs of decision-making resulting from adding the excluded jurisdictions” 
as well as the additional external costs caused by the likely increase in preference 
variety in a larger jurisdiction (Buchanan/Tullock 1962: 11). This line of reasoning can 
be further clarified by pointing to a similar trade-off, the trade-off between 
centralization and decentralization (Ahrens/Meurers 2004: 4). Exploiting scale 
economies or internalizing EU-wide external effects is welfare-enhancing but it 
necessitates EU-wide policy harmonization. And harmonization or centralization of 
policy-making in an increasingly diverse Union, as pointed out above, raises decision-
making costs and makes it progressively less feasible for political authorities to account 
for diverse political objectives, economic problems and social needs.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, policy centralization creates benefits resulting from the 
exploitation of scale economies or the internalization of different forms of cross-country 
externalities; on the other hand, it increases both decision-making and external costs 
(Alesina et al. 2001b, 2001c).
16 The decision to centralize the provision of a club good 
on the EU-level of policy making is conditional on this trade-off between external cost 
stemming from heterogeneity in preferences and needs opposed to benefits resulting 
from the internalization of positive cross-country spillovers. In their model, illustrating 
the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation by using and extending a 
model developed by Alesina et al. (2001b), Ahrens and Meurers (2003: 8) demonstrate 
that the more heterogeneous EU membership is, the larger the spillovers have to be for 
centralised decision-making to be welfare improving (see Fig 6). 
 
                                                 
16 Persson et al. (1997: 23) emphasize the advantage of decentralised decisions, which in their view, 
typically rely on better knowledge of local preferences and conditions and, accordingly, refer to a trade-
off between information and internalization instead of to the aforementioned trade-off between external 
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Fig.5   Interdependence costs for two different degrees of heterogeneity (h2 > h1) at a given 
decision-making rule n* and for collective choices made on one level of collective action, 
the harmonized EU-level.   13
 
 
Hence, economic theory offers a clear-cut rationale for the assignment of political 
responsibilities to different levels of governance within the EU: EU-wide harmonization 
and centralization are justifiable only when the object of potential harmonization 
possesses the characteristics of a public good throughout the integrated area (Schäfer 
1995: 53). Thus, the EU should leave or hand down those policy areas to sub-EU-clubs 
or even national governments, in which decision-making costs and external costs 
associated with heterogeneous political and social preferences and economic structures 
overshadow the benefits of harmonization.
17  
 
Comparing reality with the preceding theoretical considerations reveals that the de-facto 
assignment of competencies in the EU is inconsistent with economic reasoning. In some 
cases, such as agriculture, EU involvement is too extensive, whereas in other cases, 
such as the environment, EU action appears to be too limited.
18 In the course of 
European integration, the EU has drawn into its sphere of influence a range of interests 
that cannot adequately be served by a one-size-fits-all philosophy.  
 
Although closer examination of Buchanan’s theory of clubs uncovers its limitations as a 
heuristic tool due to strong assumptions, it still has analytical appeal when applied to the 
question of future European integration. The conclusion that can be drawn from club 
theory in this context can be summarised as follows: Since the cost and utility functions 
of various club members vary across different club goods, i.e. policy fields, optimal 
                                                 
17 Based on these considerations, Alesina et al. (2001a) examine nine policy fields in order to identify the 
optimal allocation of competencies. According to them, (I.) policy making should be assigned to the EU 
level (or even the global level) for “international trade policies”, the “Internal Market” and “non-sectoral 
business relations”, i.e. preserving competitive markets through anti-trust policy; (II.) “international 
relations”, the “environment”, and “money finance” should be addressed by both national authorities and 
the EU, e.g. contingent on the scope of externalities; and (III.) “education, research, and culture”, 
“sectoral business relations” (i.e., agriculture and fishing, industry and transportation), and “citizen and 
social protection” should exclusively be decided upon by national or local governments. 
18 Because empirics suggest that the current EU voting rules might be an inadequate mechanism to 
generate an allocation of policy responsibilities that satisfies the normative criteria for the optimal 
assignment of political competences, Ahrens/Hoen (2002: 38) or Feld (2003: 307), among other authors, 
argue in favour of a catalogue of exclusive and concurrent competencies in order to avoid excessive 





















Fig. 6    For a given policy field, the more heterogeneous the EU-members are, the less 
likely it is for centralized decisions taken on the EU-level of policy-making to be 
optimal. 
   And, the more heterogeneous the EU-members are, the larger the spillovers s have 
to be for centralized decision-making to be welfare improving (s2 > s1). 
C(h1) 
B(s2) 
B(s1)   14
club size will also vary conditional on respective policy realms. Hence, the central 
message of club theory is that different policy areas require different membership sizes. 
This finding supports a flexible approach to future European integration and calls for 
the adoption of a clubs-within-the-club strategy. The preceding considerations 
concerning external and decision-making costs and the benefits and costs of policy 
harmonization also support the emerging political consensus that greater flexibility is an 
unalterable prerequisite to adequately cope with the enlargement-cum-deepening 
challenge and the problem of increasing heterogeneity associated with the recent 
enlargement of the EU.  
 
6. Alternative Models of Integration 
 
More flexibility is often feared because of its seeming potential to undermine part of the 
substantial gains already achieved by European integration. Constitutional commitment, 
as prerequisite to stable expectations, is needed to protect the existing benefits from 
cooperation, in particular those attributable to the Internal Market. The difficult task 
ahead is to introduce more flexibility into the system without completely emasculating 
the acquis communautaire and to find a constitutional framework with a proper blend of 
flexibility and commitment that meets this challenge. In order to better be able to 
examine and categorise alternative ways of realising more flexible integration and to 
evaluate the idea of creating clubs within the club suggested by the above club-
theoretical findings, this part briefly presents seven basic alternative integration models 
(see fig. 7).  
 
 
6.1 Status Quo and “Ever Closer Union” 
Aiming at a uniform “ever closer Union” used to be the rather constructivist-collectivist 
approach to integration for decades, especially before the provisions for “enhanced 
cooperation” were introduced into the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1996. But as 
indicated above, one single overall EU-club providing numerous club goods to all its 
members at one single degree of integration is necessarily sub-optimal. Moreover, 
decision-making costs as well as external costs are excessively high in a heterogeneous 
Union with 25 and more members seeking to agree on each and every policy rule and 
regulation with each and every member state. Therefore, the model “status quo and ever 
closer Union”, a “pan-European picnic” at which “all participants enjoy the same 
cuisine as if they had equal tastes and the same dietary restrictions” (Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 
40), is likely to “hurt” (Dahrendorf 1979) by “causing abdominal pain” and is not likely 
to be able to cope with the challenge of integration in an enlarged Union. 
evolutionary/individualistic                              constructivist/collectivist






































Fig. 7   Alternative Models of European Integration   15
6.2 Status Quo and Multi-Speed Integration   
The usefulness of multi-speed integration as an instrument for reducing the problem of 
increased decision-making and external costs attributable to a larger and more 
heterogeneous EU is limited. (i) Since ultimate integration objectives stay the same for 
all members and therefore have to be debated and agreed upon by every single country, 
the problem of increased decision-making costs remains more or less as before: 25 plus 
x member states have to agree on common objectives and when they are to be reached 
by which countries. (ii) Since member states are allowed to proceed with integration at 
different speeds according to their capability, within some limitations, external costs 
might possibly be postponed, that is, temporarily reduced. But because the multi-speed 
approach does not permit member states to opt-out through choice rather than incapacity 
and because of the obligatory common integration endpoint for all members, the multi-
speed approach cannot permanently decrease external costs. Moreover, the common 
integration goal for all member states across all policy realms is inconsistent with the 
optimal club-theoretical solution derived above and – again – implies the disadvantages 
of an equal integration “menu” across the EU regardless of “taste” or “willingness and 
ability to pay”, even though in the multiple-speed case, member countries can at least 
take some more time to adapt to the new “cuisine”. In sum, the concept of multi-speed 
integration is not capable of permanently resolving the problems caused by a larger and 
more heterogeneous Union.
19  
6.3 Status Quo and Concentric Circles 
The concentric circles approach has some advantages over the multi-speed approach in 
that it allows countries to choose permanent different degrees of membership without 
requiring member states to achieve one common endpoint of integration. The main 
weakness of the concentric circles proposal lies in identifying a centre and peripheries 
in terms of countries rather than in terms of policy areas by telling apart a centre 
including countries that want to cooperate on virtually all aspects of integration and 
peripheries including countries that desire limited cooperation instead. Imposing clear 
and enduring boundaries between the groups of member states in the centre and in the 
predefined peripheries, instead of allowing for flexibility in terms of policy fields as 
recommended by the club-theoretic model outlined above, implies a danger of 
geographical divisions within the EU. In addition, the concentric circles approach 
pictures integration to follow a certain precise sequence and thereby rules out the 
formation of competing functional areas or clubs; instead, all member countries have to 
agree ex ante on a set of entry rules (for instance, the Maastricht criteria for EMU) and 
on a sequence of integration steps (for example, whether EMU should occur before or 
after integrated regulatory functions).  
 
While decision-making and external costs can be expected to decrease to some extent 
by allowing countries that only want limited integration depth to belong to one of the 
periphery circles, the concentric circles approach still entails relatively high external 
costs: By requiring countries to choose between one sort of membership or another, 
namely core membership or membership in one of the peripheries, some countries 
would have to commit themselves in the future to certain forms of integration (for 
example, monetary union), which they do not regard as in their best interest, in order to 
benefit from other forms (for example, a common defence policy), which are in their 
interest. Conversely, some governments might decide to stand aside from forms of 
integration they regard as desirable in order to avoid those they could not accept. Where 
this happened, an opportunity would have been missed to advance cooperation of a sort 
that all parties wanted. 
                                                 
19 See Warleigh (2002: 83ff) for a more extended discussion of the shortcomings of multi-speed models.   16
 
Overall, the concentric circles notion, which has obtained substantial attention in 
political circles, cannot be considered as a suitable and efficient way to account for 
country-specific heterogeneities with respect to different areas of integration. Owing to 
the above considerations, it seems to be more productive and less divisive to discuss 
flexible integration in terms of policy areas rather than in terms of countries (Fratianni 
1995; Harrop 2000: 309).
 20  
6.4 Status Quo and “Enhanced Cooperation” 
As demonstrated above, club-theoretical findings call for the formation of multiple 
integration clubs exhibiting various sizes and degrees of integration. Flexible integration 
of this type could theoretically be made possible on the basis of the instrument of 
“enhanced cooperation”. Allowing for “enhanced cooperation” is the present-day 
integration strategy as well as the mode of future integration currently intended by the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, whose condition is more than critical 
after the French and Dutch referenda veto.
21  
 
In principle, we argue, easing the criteria for “enhanced cooperation” and permitting the 
establishment of coexisting integration clubs in addition to the acquis would be a 
suitable and politically feasible possibility to cope with current and future integration 
challenges. The formation of multiple “enhanced cooperation” clubs would be an 
appropriate way to realize the clubs-within-the-club approach recommended by the 
club-theoretical framework presented above. Moreover, admitting numerous “enhanced 
cooperation” arrangements among smaller and more homogeneous subsets of countries 
would lead to considerable reductions in external and decision-making costs. However, 
as will be spelled out in more detail below, the existing provisions for “enhanced 
cooperation” as proposed by the Constitutional Treaty are too restrictive to realize 
flexible integration of this sort. Without modifying the requirements for “enhanced 
cooperation”, external and decision-making costs will remain high and the “enhanced 
cooperation” provisions will not be able to resolve the problem of integration in a 
heterogeneous Union comprising 25 and more member countries.  
6.5 Minimal Union and Clubs for “Enhanced Cooperation” 
As sketched out above, allowing for the formation of various “enhanced cooperation” 
clubs around an obligatory acquis communautaire can be regarded as a suitable way to 
make future integration more flexible. However, contrary to the previous option, the 
common base does not necessarily have to include all of the current acquis. As 
suggested by the above centralisation-decentralisation-trade-off-considerations in 
                                                 
20 See Warleigh (2002: 86f) for a thorough discussion of the insufficiency of the concentric circles 
approach. The reason why – despite their inadequacy – both the multi-speed and the concentric circles 
approach have influenced the political debates, may be that both models match the interests of certain key 
players in the European integration process, for multi-speed, for instance, the Commission, the Parliament 
and more federally minded member states and for concentric circles, certain German and French 
politicians.  
21 The fact that the constitutional draft as a whole must be considered “dead” (Barroso) since it cannot be 
ratified as such, does not preclude, of course, that certain elements of it – especially those that seem 
uncontroversial amongst heads of state – can be adopted through normal treaty-amendment procedures. 
The dead body may still contain healthy organs that could be transplanted into the sick body of the Nice 
Treaty. Many political actors, however, regard any attempt to revitalise parts of the constitution as 
“cherry picking” of an almost illegitimate sort. They point at the complex compromise-finding and 
package-dealing process that lead to the draft which, they say, cannot be unbundled without opening 
“Pandora’s Box” of fruitless re-negotiations. To an external observer, however, such a take-all-or-leave-it 
attitude is exactly the cause of most inefficient log-rolling outcomes that characterise the EU from its 
start. If taken to its extreme, it would preclude all piecemeal improvements in terms of institutional 
reform that would resemble any element contained in the constitutional draft.   17
section 5.3, one could argue that the extent of current policy harmonization in the acquis 
is too extensive because it includes policy fields in which the benefits resulting from the 
exploitation of scale economies and the internalization of externalities are 
overshadowed by external costs caused by policy centralisation. This in turn implies 
that sticking to the status quo may not be optimal from a theoretical point of view. 
Rather, it might be efficient to reduce the number of integration domains currently 
included in the acquis communautaire and transform the current acquis into a core-
acquis comprising only those policy fields for which harmonization is considered to be 
efficient and essential.  
 
In this context, the Union would act as “guard” of the core-acquis on the one hand, on 
the other hand as “broker”, “monitor” and “arbiter” of a variable structure of open, 
flexible, competing integration clubs. According to this approach, all members of the 
EU are members of the core; membership in the various sub-clubs is optional. Thereby, 
the club-of-clubs approach allows for different intensities of membership in the EU, but, 
in contrast to the concentric circles model, the focus is on policies, not on countries. In 
other words, contrary to the concentric circles approach, the concept of creating 
different policy field clubs around a core acquis is functional rather than geographical.  
 
It could be argued that the difference between concentric circles integration and flexible 
integration according to the club-of-clubs approach is only a matter of semantics. Of 
course, the core of countries under the model of concentric circles could be a group of 
countries which, under flexible integration à la club-of-clubs, would choose to belong to 
all existing clubs. It is not unlikely that such an outcome would occur. However, there 
are important differences between the two models. The concentric circle approach is 
much more rigid than the club-of-clubs strategy. According to the concentric circles 
approach, flexibility is implemented only through negative choices by a system of 
derogations and opt-outs and the integration sequence is fixed in advance. The clubs-
within-the-club-approach, on the other hand, would be more flexible by giving member 
states complete freedom to create new forms of cooperation or deepen existing ones and 
by keeping no member from leaving any sphere of integration (with the exception of the 
core-acquis). Moreover, in contrast to the concentric circles concept, the clubs-within-
the-club strategy pictures Europe to consist of several different clubs, treating member 
countries as members of different clubs rather than as one single club with different 
classes. At first sight, this difference may seem small; in fact, it is fundamental. As 
sketched out above, the concentric circles approach requires countries to choose 
between one sort of membership class or another entailing the risk of missing out on 
opportunities of cooperation of a sort that is in the interest of all parties involved. 
Accounting for every single opportunity of collaboration that is in each party’s interest 
and exploiting mutual gains from cooperation is exactly what the club-of-clubs 
approach aims at. For instance, in contrast to the concentric circles approach, the clubs-
within-the-club concept would allow a country to join in “enhanced cooperation” in the 
realm of security without adopting the single currency – or vice versa. In sum, a Union 
of different clubs therefore looks preferable to a union of different classes.  
 
Flexible integration according to the clubs-within-the-club strategy, a process by which 
all member states agree to disagree about their priorities but permit their members to 
surge ahead with an objective which they share as a sub-group, caters both to the 
legitimately particularist needs of individual member states and to the disparities of 
economic and political endowments in a heterogeneous group of 25 and more countries. 
Every country would be allowed to choose, which parts of the integration process it 
would like participate in; thus, choice would become the key principle of participation 
in the Union. At the same time, the clubs-within-the-club approach breaks down one 
high integration hurdle – the acquis – into a lower hurdle – the core-acquis – and   18
various optional hurdles. In fact, previous experiences with flexibility, which aimed at 
fostering deeper integration, have been quite successful and in many cases have had 
centripetal effects. Thus, flexibility has not always been the end stage but often a 
stepping stone towards further integration of all member states.
22   
 
According the clubs-within-the-club model, members would have complete freedom to 
create new forms of cooperation or deepen existing ones and no barriers would keep a 
member from leaving an integration club. Since no member is constrained to accept any 
common policy that it dislikes, external costs would be reduced significantly. Moreover, 
decision-making costs will be considerably lower for decisions made in various smaller 
and more homogeneous clubs than for decisions made in the overall Union. If the Union 
is to have a core, this core should not be a group of countries pretending to agree about 
everything, but rather issues on which all members genuinely agree, for example, the 
need to preserve and extend the Internal Market. Apart from the core, there should be 
room for choice; however, not country by country in an all-or-nothing way, but issue by 
issue, according to national needs and interests. Thus, the “minimal union plus 
enhanced cooperation” model is composed of a “multiple-course menu consisting of 
main courses to be shared by everybody and additional ones that can be consumed 
according to individual preferences” (Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 41). 
6.6 Pure Club Solution and the “EU” as Club- Referee 
Like the preceding concept, the pure club solution is based on the formation of 
numerous competing integration clubs. But in contrast to the previous option, it does not 
envisage a set of core policy fields that is obligatory for all EU members such that 
countries can freely “pick and choose” from European laws and regulation menu. The 
pure club solution without a common base reduces the role of the “EU” to that of a 
“mediator”, an “arbitrator” or a “referee” of the numerous European clubs. This 
approach allows for even more flexibility than the aforementioned concepts and is likely 
to reduce external and decision-costs even further.  
 
However, the pure club solution implies several shortcomings. First of all, such an 
option may lead to an entirely fragmented Union. Besides, the pure club solution might 
erode the Internal Market and other crucial accomplishments of the integration process 
to date by unravelling fundamental compromises. In addition, with the pure club 
solution the EU risks evolving into a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
among states, with no clear role for EU institutions. Moreover, in light of all the sunk 
costs involved in agreeing on the current common base of the Union, the acquis, it 
seems questionable whether politicians would be willing to dissolve this base entirely. 
Furthermore, while considering the cost efficiency of the pure club solution, one also 
has to take into account that the costs of reorganizing the current Union into an 
assembly of clubs might be considerably high. Last but not least, the pure club solution 
may not be feasible because it seems doubtful that all relevant European policy issues 
can be organised and decided on separately from each other in different clubs 
respectively. In light of these disadvantages and problems, it seems doubtful whether 
the pure club solution represents an appropriate and politically feasible solution. 
6.7 Pure FOCJ Solution 
In its extreme, the ultimate outcome of flexible integration may resemble the concept of 
“Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions” (FOCJ) that has been elaborated by 
                                                 
22 Pointing to the fact that some of the most significant steps towards deeper integration in the 1990s were 
linked with flexible arrangements either within or outside the framework of EU law, Kölliker (2001: 30f) 
and Grieser (2003: 256) arrive at the conclusion that flexibility has resulted in resolving national 
reluctance and lead to significant integration progress.    19
Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1999). In that case, like in the pure club solution, 
there is no common base for all member states. In addition, club goods are not 
necessarily provided for by clubs consisting of national states, but by sub-national 
jurisdictions (municipalities, regions, etc.) that cooperate in order to address common 
political concerns and provide their preferred level and type of public goods. 
 
To be sure, the implementation of the FOCJ concept in the EU would imply even 
stronger fragmentation and complexity than the pure club solution. Moreover, the FOCJ 
concept not only involves several practical shortcomings, it is also controversial from a 
theoretical point of view.
23 First of all, the FOCJ solution implies extensive information 
and transaction costs. Moreover, it is not clear who has the right to choose between 
different FOCJ, individuals or communes. The problem is that some of the advantages 
that Frey and Eichenberger (1999) stress with respect to their concept, for instance, exit 
at minimal costs, only apply to cases in which individuals have the choice to enter or 
exit FOCJ. Such an individual FOCJ approach, however, can only be realised with 
respect to excludable goods. But if exclusion is feasible, then the question is why the 
function in question is not being privatised. Nevertheless, the FOCJ solution can be seen 
as a potentially useful supplement to the club model. 
6.8 Which Integration Model for Europe? 
The brief discussion of the above integration models suggests the option “minimal 
union plus enhanced cooperation clubs” to be the most adequate and efficient strategy 
for future integration. According to this club-of-clubs concept, flexibility should be 
complemented by an agreement about core policy areas which must be dealt with by the 
entire EU. Thus, the clubs-within-the-cub approach combines firm commitment by all 
members to a common base, including a well-defined set of policies related to the 
Internal Market, with optional integration in the remaining integration areas through 
open clubs.  
 
The clubs-within-the-club approach neither takes for granted that all EU members 
aspire the same goal nor rules that out. Besides, it does not relegate certain member 
states to the periphery classifying as core subject policies those which they are 
incapable or unwilling to implement. Rather it accounts for permanent variety between 
member states’ capability and wish to participate on an issue-by-issue basis, even within 
a policy area. 
 
As sketched out above, the EU seems to be “too large” in terms of too many decisions 
made on the EU-level of policy making and in terms of disproportionate high external 
cost because of the large number of heterogeneous individuals having to live with the 
same decisions and obey the same rules and regulations. From the perspective of club 
theory and taking account of the trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation, it 
is not apparent why each and every policy field should be fully harmonized across all 
member states. Given club theoretical considerations and research on multi-product 
clubs, quite the opposite seems to be true: partitioning the overall EU-club into various 
smaller clubs exhibiting different degrees of integration and transforming the EU into a 
“club of clubs”, that is, into “an association of sovereign states, which pool their 
sovereignty in very restricted areas or to varying degrees” (Siedentop 2000: 1) promises 
to be a suitable strategy to resolve the future integration challenges in a larger and more 
                                                 
23 See Vanberg (2000) for a detailed critique of the FOCJ concept. Holzinger (2001) discusses why it 
would be premature to fully give up the traditional link of policies to territories and to introduce 
functional jurisdictions in its stead; she favours a concept of optimal regulatory areas, which are designed 
to re-establish the congruence of functional areas and territorial jurisdictions.   20
diverse Union. In sum, the club-of-clubs approach is the most realistic way of coping 
with the much-enlarged EU and overcoming the paralysis of the Union. 
 
7.  The European Union as Club of Clubs Around a Common Core 
 
It is in fact not only the idle product of ideal-type economic reasoning to imagine 
several different-sized EU-sub-clubs with various members across different policy 
fields instead of one single overall EU-club comprising 25 and more heterogeneous 
members. Even though they are still exceptions, there already are a number of different-
sized “sub-clubs” within the EU. While, for instance, the Internal Market covers all EU 
members, some of the by now existing clubs comprise only a subgroup of EU-members, 
such as the EMU, and some embrace several EU-members as well as non-EU-members, 
such as the WEU. In what follows, we will discuss how flexibility can be made to work 
if a kind of clubs-within-the-club approach is applied to the integration process. Before 
addressing the question of how the club-of-clubs strategy could be institutionalised, let 
us now discuss the basic theoretical elements of the clubs-within-the-club concept in 
more detail and examine the notion of permitting the formation of various facultative, 
open integration clubs around a core comprising certain obligatory policy fields.  
7.1 Obligatory and Optional Policy Fields 
The flexible integration approach presented in this paper proposes to distinguish 
European policies and the corresponding goods and services to either be provided (a) by 
the obligatory overall EU-club-core or (b) by optional EU-sub-clubs.  
 
(a) As already sketched out in the discussion of the centralisation-decentralisation-
trade-off, for goods with a high degree of externality or for goods exhibiting 
increasing returns, the optimal club size is likely to be large and in the case of 
EU-wide public goods EU-wide harmonised policies and regulations can be 
considered as efficient (Fratianni 2003: 14). Accordingly, obligatory deepening 
is optimal with respect to such supranational EU-wide public goods: the gains 
from internalizing external effects and scale economies will outweigh increased 
decision-making and external costs as a result of policy harmonisation.
24 
(b) No obligatory EU-wide harmonization but instead the realization of modes of 
flexible integration are efficient if the benefits caused by the internalization of 
external effects and scale economies are overshadowed by the rise in external 
and decision-making costs in a larger and more heterogeneous integration area.
25 
  
Therefore, the adoption of the clubs-within-the-club approach proposed in this paper 
requires one to specify (a) the core of the EU-acquis, which provides non-excludable 
and non-rival European-wide public goods to all its members, and (b) the periphery, 
comprising facultative policy fields. 
7.2   The Core-Acquis 
The core-acquis would have to be observed by each and every member of the EU; it is 
the minimum requirement for participation in the EU and, at the same time, the largest 
common denominator of the Union. It should contain well-defined integration areas for 
which integration is regarded as essential, the most important of which are the basic, 
                                                 
24 Compulsory membership is necessary concerning EU-wide public goods, for example to protect the 
Internal Market or conduct defence policy and prevent free-riding.. 
25 For example, this could be the case in policy fields such as social welfare, regional aid, sectoral 
business relations, and labour-market policies, where Ahrens/Meurers (2004: 31) found that the newly 
admitted EU members are likely to tip the scales toward inefficient centralization.    21
“universalisiable” provisions of the Internal Market.
26 With the exception of the Internal 
Market there is no theoretically unchallenged consensus over which policy fields should 
be in the core (Harrop 2000: 308; Warleigh 2002: 64).
27 This hard core should also be 
politically unchallenged. However, past and present relapses into economic nationalism 
even within the EU (e.g. fending off a free trade in services, protecting “national 
champions” from EU-takeovers) show that national governments and members of the 
European Parliament often enough are caught in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in 
which only a credible constitutional commitment or the power of independent 
authorities in the Commission can be trusted to ensure the viability of long-term 
common interests. In addition to the Internal Market with the guarantee of the “Four 
Liberties”, the core-acquis, as proposed by the analysis conducted by Alesina et al. 
(2001a), should also include international trade policy and competition policy 
preserving competitive markets. Moreover, it may also contain the guaranteed 
convertibility of currencies, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as 




The main reason to have a common core with obligatory policy fields is that in those 
policy fields the benefits of internalizing externalities and scale economies will exceed 
the costs that result from common policies and regulations when national needs and 
preferences are heterogeneous. Another advantage of the existence of a core-acquis is 
that European integration would otherwise potentially be at risk to fall apart. The 
existence of an obligatory core will prevent flexibility to be “an impulse towards 
fragmentation which will ultimately tear the Union apart” (Weatherill 2000: 2).   
7.3 The Clubs within the Club 
While participation in the core-acquis is mandatory, in the remaining policy fields 
member countries, can freely choose to participate in those clubs from which they hope 
to benefit. In contrast to the obligatory common base of the overall EU-club, the EU 
sub-clubs are voluntary arrangements for cooperation in the policy fields outside the 
core. Not every country must participate in every sub-club, and members can, under 
some rules, set up new sub-clubs or close existing ones. The clubs-within-the-club 
approach allows for multiple overlapping and non-overlapping clubs.
29 The number of 
overlapping and non-overlapping integration areas depends on the number of club 
goods for which the EU citizens, according to their preferences, have a demand (Schäfer 
1995: 56). An example for multiple clubs may be three environmental clubs to protect 
the water quality of the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, respectively 
(Dewatripont et al. 1995). Given its location and ambitions, a country may prefer to join 
none, one or more than one of these clubs. In essence, voluntary sub-clubs introduce the 
flexibility needed to adapt the Union to the heterogeneity of its members. Moreover, 
they create opportunities for experimenting with new forms of cooperation. 
 
                                                 
26 Wohlgemuth and Sideras (2004: 20f) argue that the provisions of the Internal Market contain key 
elements of an universalisable order resembling Hayek’s (1938/39) vision of “Interstate Federalism”.   
27 For example, Dahrendorf’s list of core policies in his discussion of Europe à la carte includes foreign 
policy, trade, monetary policy and overseas development; Ahrens and Hoen (2002: 35) suggest the 
Internal Market, indirect taxation policies, the CFSP as well as police and judicial cooperation in cross-
country criminal matters to be in the core. 
28 For instance, it may be a useful means to strengthen the operational side of cooperation in the field of 
security policy via trans-national police forces, border guards, a European judicial area and intelligence 
cooperation. See also Feld (2003: 308) on judicial cooperation in cross-country criminal matters like 
protection against terrorism and Persson et al. (1997: 26) on political economy reflections on why there 
is reluctance to centralize defence policy. 
29 On overlapping clubs, see Casella/Frey (1992), Schäfer (1995) as well as Frey/Eichenberger (1999).    22
 
 
8. Evaluation of the Clubs-within-the-Club Approach 
 
After the brief outline of the clubs-within-the-club concept, this part attempts to discuss 




8.1.1 Complexity and Management Challenges  
Possibly the utmost and most apparent disadvantage of the clubs-within-the-club 
approach – and flexibility in general – is that it would aggravate the already striking 
complexity of the EU system and would cause considerable challenges of 
manageability. On the other hand, one could argue that the member states will be more 
likely to confer the additional necessary management and administrative capacities to 
the EU if the rules and regulations, which they agree to, and their involvement in 
general corresponds more closely to their national preferences, interests and needs 
(Warleigh 2002: 88). Still, management and administrative costs are likely to increase 
in total, partially offsetting some benefits of the more efficient club-of-clubs solution 
outlined above.  
 
8.1.2 Flexibility and the Principle of Uniformity  
One of the cornerstones upon which the Treaties of Paris and Rome have based the 
three European Communities was the principle of equal rights and obligations for all 
member states.
30 The introduction of more and more elements of flexibility and legal 
differentiation has challenged the orthodox doctrine of legal uniformity. Many authors, 
including Grieser, argue that the differentiation of law is a necessary consequence of the 
increase in heterogeneity among the EU member states (Grieser 2003: 176). According 
to this view, uniform rules cannot, sad as it may be in terms of coherence and 
transparency of the Union’s legal framework, do justice to these differences and 
differentiation is therefore inevitable.  
 
Becker (1998: 42), among others, argues that the attempt to impose uniformity for its 
own sake is undesirable because legal uniformity is not intended to be an end in it itself 
but rather a tool for integration. Therefore, since in the course of fostering flexibility, 
the principle of uniformity will only be weakened in order to enhance integration, from 
this perspective, the principle of legal uniformity does not prohibit the differentiation of 
the European legal framework. 
 
8.1.3 Further Problems  
Flexible integration according to the club-of-clubs approach may also lead to problems 
of separability because the disentanglement of European club goods and their separate 
provision in different clubs may be problematic in some cases due to interdependencies 
between certain policy fields. A further problem is that flexibility might possibly cause 
legal uncertainties, which, then again, would have to be weighed against the current 
legal uncertainties in the EU. Another potential danger is that the various integration-
clubs would evolve into fortresses within the “Fortress Europe” and degenerate into 
                                                 
30 This principle and the idea that EU institutions and rules had to be accepted by all member countries 
and that EC law should be a means of harmonization was a good working principle so long as countries 
had common objectives and the economies had similar structures (Fratianni 2003: 20f).   23
political cartels. It could also be argued that flexible integration might result in a 
deterioration of the Internal Market and other achievements of the EU to date. However, 
it is unlikely that member states which have – economically and politically – invested so 
heavily in the Internal Market and the Euro would suddenly want to drop out of both 
and in so doing get no return from their sunk costs and their freely chosen but in many 
cases painful commitments.   
 
8.1.4 The Need for Rule-Based Flexibility  
In sum, it cannot be repudiated that flexibility creates risks and challenges, for instance 
administrative challenges in terms of assuring the more differentiated Union is 
“policied” effectively or legal challenges in terms of how to cope with a more 
differentiated legal framework.
31 Flexibility can be seen as the key to reconvening the 
“widening or deepening” debate, since it promises both, albeit at the now seemingly 
inevitable price of abandoning an all-embracing uniformity of application of the law. 
Nevertheless, one can also argue that the greatest risk is that, much like in the case of 
subsidiarity, flexibility will turn out to be still one more potentially valuable principle of 
Union governance which falls short of becoming adequately operationalized because 
European integration is to a large extent characterized by a process of “muddling 
through” and the ad-hoc reaction to pressing needs rather than the elaboration of a 
detailed strategy for action over the medium to long term (Warleigh 2002: 57). 
 
However, if flexibility, even though it is likely to increase complexity, is in fact 
inevitable, then it should – at least – not be applied in an ad-hoc manner but rather in a 
systematic and rule-based way. Conversely, most flexibility realized so far, has 
generally not been attained according to certain transparent rules, rather it has been 
realized by granting exceptions as the often unintentional outcome of the bargaining 
hassle of day-to-day politics. Accordingly, many of the various existing  forms of 
flexible integration, namely the exceptions and opt-outs regarding, for example, the 
Monetary Union and Schengen, are incoherent, non-transparent, unsystematic, 
ambiguous, confusing and unclear (Grieser 2003: 255).  
 
This lack of transparency with respect to flexible integration may in turn cause lack of 
citizens’ acceptance due to incomprehensibility
 (Martenczuk 2000: 359). Moreover, the 
decision to grant a country an exception with respect to uniform integration and allow 
for opt-outs has so far been essentially contingent on the bargaining power of the 
respective member state (Grieser 2003: 255). Concerning the goal of a “Europe of 
citizens”, the tendency to cope with differences by making exceptions and granting 
certain – most likely more powerful – countries a special status is precarious. If – as is 
the growing consensus – more flexibility is inescapable, then it is preferable to attain 
flexibility according to a conscious and transparent strategy instead of accepting it as an 
unintended consequence arising out of an accumulation of pressures within the Union. 
The crucial issue is to provide flexibility without ad-hoc arrangements and without 
creating so many exceptions and special cases that ultimately it distorts and discredits 
the whole Union
 (Harrop 2000: 307). As is intended by the combination of graduated 
and differentiated integration in the club-of-clubs approach, flexible integration should 
instead transparently offer systematic choices, be rules-based and predictable. 
8.2. Advantages  
As economic theory suggests, the clubs-within-the-club approach is, at least on paper, 
an appropriate means to resolve the increased tension between deepening and widening. 
As it turns out however, conceiving the EU as a club of clubs is not only consistent with 
neo-classical economic theory; rather, it is also compatible with the basic “mutual 
                                                 
31 See Warleigh (2002: 57ff).   24
gains” notion of the contractarian constitutional paradigm and appears to be a suitable 
strategy in light of the constitutional economics approach.
32 According to Vanberg, one 
of the most important messages of the contractarian constitutional paradigm is that, 
“compared to its feasible alternatives, seeking to explore potential gains from 
cooperation” is “the socially more productive strategy” (Vanberg 2003b: 18). Since 
“seeking to explore potential gains from cooperation” is at the heart of the formation of 
voluntary policy clubs within the EU, the clubs-within-the-club approach, relative to its 
feasible alternatives, can be regarded as the “socially more productive strategy” from 
the perspective of constitutional economics. In view of this paradigm, we can identify 
various additional advantages of a “socially productive strategy” of club formation 
within the EU and show that there are good reasons to view flexible instead of one-size-
fits-all integration, not only as inevitable but also as desirable.  
 
8.2.1 Commitment - Flexibility Combination  
First of all, the advantage of the club-of-clubs procedure is that it allows for greater 
variety and diversity without endangering the great achievements of European 
integration, namely the Internal Market and the “Four Liberties”. Defining obligatory 
core policies and allowing for the formation of optional clubs in the remaining policy 
realms introduces more flexibility to accommodate the heterogeneous interests and 
needs in Europe without risking the gains attained through past integration. Thus, the 
club-of-clubs approach yields a combination of commitment and flexibility that is 
superior both to the status quo and to other proposals for flexible integration like multi-
speed or concentric circles.  
 
8.2.2 Reduction of Integration Costs  
Although, as discussed above, administrative costs might increase as a consequence of 
transforming the EU into a club of clubs, the clubs-within-the-club approach, according 
to economic theory, still has the advantage of being relatively cost efficient and may 
even result in a reduction of overall costs. By permitting the formation of overlapping, 
competing clubs, the costs of future integration could be reduced for the following 
reasons:  
 
(1.)  Competition among the various integration clubs does not only imply higher 
allocative but also larger dynamic efficiency gains, which eventually lead to a 
cutback in costs for providing European club goods and to welfare 
improvements in the EU member states (Ahrens/Meurers 2004: 31).  
(2.)  Since decision-making costs will decrease due to the more homogeneous 
population in the smaller sub-clubs, the club-of-clubs approach would reduce 
the costs of finding consensus and making agreements.  
(3.)  A decentralized, competitive process of club formation with more 
homogeneous populations would lower external costs because countries, and 
possibly sub-national units, can search for cooperation in those functions in 
which they have a real demand for cooperation, and they are not forced into 
cooperation with respect to functions on which they want to stand alone.  
(4.)  The clubs-within-the-club approach could possibly attenuate political power 
and bargaining struggles and thereby further reduce political transaction costs. 
                                                 
32 As Vanberg (2003a: 8) argues, the contractarian-constitutional-economics notion of mutual gains from 
joint commitment suggests a political organisational structure, “in der Bürgergenossenschaften in 
vielfältigen Abstufungen und Überlappungen, von rein lokalen bis hin zu weltumspannenden 
Interessengemeinsamkeiten, wechselseitige Vorteile durch geeignete Regelbindungen realisieren 
können”, z.B. durch “eine flexible föderale Struktur, in der die für die Realisierung gemeinsamer Vorteile 
erforderlichen Regelbindungen jeweils auf der gebietskörperschaftlichen Ebene erfolgen (und die dadurch 
geschaffenen Entscheidungskompetenzen jeweils der Ebene zugeordnet werden), die sich mit den 
Grenzen der in Frage stehenden Interessentengruppe am ehesten deckt”.   25
For instance, the application of the club-of-clubs idea reduces the risk of 
blackmailing by veto-players and decreases the necessity for mutual haggling 
over privileges via log-rolling against the common interests of citizens; it also 
reduces the threat of inefficient package deals and discriminatory rules 
benefiting some and harming others (Wohlgemuth/ Sideras 2004: 23).  
(5.)  Flexible integration will alleviate the trade-offs between efficiency, legitimacy 
and enlargement: Due to the increase in decision-making costs as a result of 
enlargement, from the Buchanan/Tullock (1962) perspective, more majority 
decisions are necessary; this, however, requires the overruled minority to 
accept decisions contrary to its preferences, which in turn requires a minimum 
of European identity and solidarity, which will, however, be less probable with 
a (further) enlarged Union  
 
In sum, the club-of-clubs concept compares favourably to the traditional form of 
integration undertaken in the EU: a systematic and institutionally safeguarded 
partitioning of the overall European club into competing sub-clubs promises to yield 
more efficient economic outcomes and contribute to ease persistent political power 
struggles.   
 
8.2.3 Responsiveness to Citizens’ Preferences  
The freedom of citizens to choose between the institutional arrangements of numerous 
clubs that involve different costs and benefits corresponding to diverse needs and tastes, 
alongside the freedom of clubs to modify and differentiate their institutional supply,  
generates institutional competition among the various integration clubs. Such 
competition can help to enhance citizen sovereignty, that is, make self-interested 
politicians and government bureaucrats more responsive to citizens’ interest (Vanberg 
2000: 363). The key incentive to increase responsiveness to citizens’ preferences is the 
“exit” option (Hirschman 1970), that is, the possibility for citizens to express their 
preferences by “voting with their feet” (Tiebout 1956) and leave the club (“institutional 
arbitrage”). For politicians, the threat of dissatisfied citizens’ opting out – thereby 
foregoing their net contribution to the club good – provides an incentive to take 
individual preferences into account and to provide the respective club good efficiently. 
 
In addition to the choice for individual citizens to enter or exit a club, club competition 
generates the possibility for entire jurisdictions to collectively join or exit one club or 
another or to establish a new club of nation states. Thereby, competition between 
integration clubs can cause inefficient clubs to be crowed out and new efficient clubs to 
be formed (Schäfer 1995: 57). Moreover, since the club-of-clubs approach increases 
both the governments’ incentives and possibilities to satisfy individual preferences, 
policies will be better directed at and take account of heterogeneous preferences at 
national and possibly sub-national levels.  
 
A further advantage in this context is that the focus of the club-of-clubs approach is on 
functions or policy areas. Due to the concentration of clubs on one functional area, the 
citizens of that particular club are likely to have better information on its activity and 
are in a better position to compare its performance to other clubs (Frey/Eichenberger 
2000: 12). This in turn further increases club competition, which again will increase the 
politicians’ responsiveness to citizen’s preferences.
33  
 
                                                 
33As Schäfer (1995: 61) argues, politicians’ appeal to endorse a uniform EU potentially disregards that 
emotional ties are more likely to be cultivated in smaller clubs rather than in large centralized structures, 
and that supposedly they are stronger in clubs that are organised functionally “from bottom up” than they 
are in political structures that are imposed on citizens “from above”.   26
 
8.2.4 Flexible Integration as Evolutionary “Discovery Procedure”  
Another major advantage of the club-of-clubs concept is that it is process-oriented: 
while it specifies the process of club formation (for example, how new clubs may be 
established), it does not determine the club-of-clubs outcome (for instance, what 
functions are to be provided by which club). The procedural nature of the concept 
implies an important advantage with respect to knowledge. This is crucial because, as 
noted in part three, one must bear in mind that the reduction of the risk of undesirable 
decisions being made and the risk of decisions, which would benefit all, not being 
made, not only involves preference-related problems, but also severe knowledge 
problems and “limits of reason” as it is not always apparent where the common interests 
of the citizens lie or how to serve them in the most efficient manner (Vanberg/Buchanan 
1991). In this context, competition among the various clubs can, by stimulating 
“desirable experimentation”, resolve the “limits of reason” challenge by serving as 
knowledge-creating “discovery procedure” of such political preferences and problem 
solutions “as, without resort to it, would not be known to anyone, or at least would not 
be utilized” (Hayek 1968/78: 179).
34  
 
By allowing the formation of various competing clubs, the clubs-within-the-club 
approach promotes decentralised competition between different forms and practices of 
cooperation allowing citizens and politicians to learn about their advantages and 
disadvantages. Thereby, club competition helps to “discover” which institutional 
framework is considered to be advantageous in the eyes of resource owners, mobile 
voters and political entrepreneurs. Whereas “experiments in innovative regulation 
opportunities are lost under the stifling impact of exhaustive harmonization” (Weatherill 
2000: 4), under flexible rules of integration, individual member states, and possibly also 
sub-national units, are free to experiment with a range of integration clubs.  
 
Without competition between voluntary, flexible modes of integration, the different and 
fluctuating opportunity costs of European policies would remain unknown and the 
different and fluctuating integration capacities of individual regions would not be used. 
In other words, “since the discovery of common citizens’ interests and the best methods 
of advancing them depends on the initiative of political entrepreneurs and the ability of 
citizens to assess relevant alternatives”, system competition among clubs can, “apart 
from its motivating force, play a useful role in generating information to help political 
entrepreneurs solve the problem, and to facilitate citizens’ evaluation of political 
performances by providing them with standards of comparison” (Vanberg 1999: 8). In 
sum, for mobile citizens and agile politicians club competition is likely to result in 
better protection against exploitation by the majority and will yield better insight into 
suitable policies.  
 
8.2.5 Parallel and Consecutive Experimentation 
A further advantage of competition between numerous European integration clubs 
becomes obvious by looking at the distinction between parallel and consecutive 
experimentation discussed by Vanberg and Kerber (1995). A European Union with fully 
                                                 
34 The significance of political competitive dynamics for yielding knowledge on how governments can 
serve the interests of their citizens better is noted by Hayek (1944: 325; 1848: 255-69; 1960: 184f, 263f). 
The role of competition among jurisdictions as a „discovery procedure” is also discussed, for example, by 
Kerber/Vanberg (1995: 42ff) and Wohlgemuth (2006). Institutional competition among clubs can be 
expected to assist, in its role as a discovery procedure, “governments and citizens in solving the by no 
means trivial problem of ascertaining precisely” which club “characteristics and services best serve the 
common interests of citizens”, and how they “can be provided most efficiently” (Vanberg 1999: 36). 
Moreover, competition among clubs can serve as “salutary check” on the states’ interventionist intentions 
(Hayek 1939/80: 268).   27
harmonized policies is restricted to consecutive  experimentation and consecutive 
learning by trial and error. Club competition, on the other hand, will create a real 
“parallel process” à la Hoppmann enabling parallel experimentation and parallel 
learning by direct comparison of the problem-solving-qualities of simultaneously tested 
policy “hypotheses” (Hoppmann 1967: 88f). Which integration alternatives exist and 
which steps towards integration are desired, suitable and feasible for which states and 
which regions has to be discovered by parallel experimentation. Thus, compared to its 
realistic alternative, club competition appears to be a more promising and less risky 
procedure to identify and correct political aberrations and to react to a continuously 
changing variety of preferences and problems. Without competition among different 
forms of integration inaptly “harmonized” or centralized “policy-hypotheses” are – for 
lack of observable and selectable alternatives – hard to identify. Moreover, the existence 
of irreversible path dependence is more likely because – due to complex logrolling 
agreements – mistakes, even if they are detected, can hardly be revised in “integrated”, 
interwoven policy cartels. 
 
8.2.6 Club Competition and Democracy  
Forming clubs within the club and thereby increasing the complexity of the EU does not 
only imply potential manageability challenges; it might also make the Union less 
transparent: as each member state would belong to different clubs, country-specific 
rights and obligations in the Union might be difficult to comprehend.
35 As transparency 
problems will make it less obvious who is responsible for what, a flexible EU system 
may be even more difficult to understand and to hold responsible; this in turn, one could 
argue, may reduce the degree of popular participation, since citizens who cannot 
comprehend the system are less likely to get involved (Warleigh 2002: 70). Since its 
democratic legitimacy has been exposed to increasing and continual criticism, these are 
undeniably important concerns for the EU. However, one would expect that citizens will 
be more likely to participate and take active part in a flexible Union whose range and 
degree of integration and governance is more in accordance with their social and 
economic circumstances, cultural traditions and public opinions.
36  
 
In order to analyse and evaluate competition among EU-sub-clubs in terms of its 
consequences for democracy from the view point of constitutional economics, it is first 
necessary to clarify which performance criterion should be used to assess democracy 
and democratic polities such as the EU or EU-sub-clubs. For this purpose, it is helpful 
to view jurisdictions – such as the EU or EU-sub-clubs – as “territorial enterprises”, that 
is to say, as organisations that offer jurisdiction services and characteristics – such as 
European goods – to the inhabitants and users of their respective territorial realms 
(Vanberg 1999: 3). If we think of jurisdictions as “territorial enterprises” in this sense, 
we can describe democratic jurisdictions as “cooperative venture[s] for mutual 
advantage” (Rawls 1971: 84), that is, as “territorial enterprises”, which are owned by 
                                                 
35 For a discussion of flexibility resulting in lack of transparency see Warleigh (2002: 70ff). Although one 
could argue that there are reasons for anxiety about the injection of intransparency into the system, it is 
important to keep in mind, that the present-day European institutional and legal system is neither easy to 
understand nor transparent; the complexity of the rules of the integration game in the EU has already spun 
a complex web of EU institutions that defy simple categorization and has already become almost 
forbiddingly difficult to understand (Weatherill 2000: 3; Fratianni 2003: 13). 
36 Moreover, the matter of fact that flexibility allows for and enshrines diversity can be seen to have 
normative value for at least two reasons (Warleigh 2002: 72): First, because it does not aim at a 
homogeneous and uniform integration end result but allows member states to experiment with several 
types of governance, it allows member states to focus on what unifies and connects them rather than what 
separates them. Second, flexibility also tolerates that some discrepancies between the positions of the 
member states and their citizens on the desirable final outcome of the integration process may be 
permanent; given the existence of such discrepancies, trying to enforce and inflict uniformity, instead of 
arriving at reciprocally agreeable outcomes, can be seen to be normatively objectionable.    28
their members, namely their citizens (Vanberg 1999: 4). From this perspective, the 
fundamental defining criterion of democratic polities is that their members or citizens 
are the principals or ultimate sovereigns of their collective enterprise (ibid: 4; Vanberg 
2001: 3). Just as it is, in general, the objective of member-owned organisations to 
advance the interests of their members, we can say that democratic polities should serve 
the common interests of their members, that is to say, their citizens (Vanberg 1999: 4). 
 
Accordingly, the performance of democratic polities like the EU-club is to be evaluated 
in terms of how well they serve the common interests of the citizens and how well they 
enable them to realize mutual gains. This criterion for the efficiency of democratic 
polities, analogous to consumer sovereignty as a criterion for the efficiency of markets, 
may be defined as citizen sovereignty. Ensuring citizen sovereignty can be understood 
to mean to organize a democratic polity such that the government is, on the one hand, 
capable of implementing policies which benefit all citizens (“enabling constitution”), 
while it is, on the other hand, prevented, as far as possible, from acting against the 
interests of some or even all of its citizens such they are protected against exploitation 
(“limiting constitution”) (Vanberg 1999: 4f).  
 
According to Vanberg, competition among jurisdictions is not incompatible with the 
notion of democracy as specified above; to the contrary, it can make a valuable 
contribution to “the improvement of democracy” (ibid: 35). In analogy to Vanberg’s 
argument with respect to jurisdictions in general, it can be argued that competition 
among policy clubs within the EU can be expected to improve democracy: As far as the 
first task of democratic constitutions is concerned, namely the ability of governments to 
implement measures that do in fact conform with the common interests of all citizens, 
competition among EU-sub-clubs – in its capacity as “discovery procedure” (Hayek 
1968/69) – can be expected to resolve the problem of determining which European 
goods and services best serve the common interest of which European citizens and how 
they can be provided most efficiently. In terms of the second task of democratic 
constitutions, namely preventing governments from conducting ventures that clash with 
the interests of some or all citizens, club competition can also improve democracy. The 
reason is that, “to the extent of their own mobility and of their resources”, competition 
among clubs offers citizens and club-members a safeguard against exploitation by 
privileged groups or by those with political decision-making power by making it more 
difficult for governments to perform tasks that benefit some citizens at the expense of 
others (Vanberg 1999: 35f). In sum, competition among clubs can enhance the capacity 
of democratic governments to serve the common interests of their constituents by 
limiting the scope for rent-seeking and by serving as a “discovery procedure”. Thus, 
flexibility and democracy do not necessarily have to be in opposition; to the contrary, 
flexibility can also be seen to facilitate and favour democracy.  
 
9. Flexibility and “Enhanced Cooperation” 
 
The idea that underlies the Treaties of Rome and their modifications as well as the 
present-day Union is that the integrated area should become as homogeneous as 
possible and that integration means creating uniformity.
37 But as the above 
considerations should have made clear, the uniformity principle can hardly be an 
adequate concept for a Union characterised by growing diversity. As the pressure to 
introduce more flexibility into EU integration mounts, this section, focusing on 
                                                 
37 See Schäfer 1995: 50. For a detailed analysis of the uniformity principle see Grieser (2003: 252ff).   29
“enhanced cooperation” as one potential way to implement a more flexible integration 
process and allow for the creation of EU-sub-clubs, briefly examines what role 
flexibility has played in the history of European integration to date and how it was 
envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty.  
9.1 A Brief History of Flexibility  
The history of European integration shows that flexibility is far from novel in the 
development of the EU.
38 Already in the 1980s several exceptions to the uniformity 
principle were made, for example concerning the Schengen Agreement,
39 the Western 
European Union and the Social Charter. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) explicitly 
allowed for ad-hoc solutions in order to foster flexibility, the most pronounced example 
being the agreement on the Economic and Monetary Union that opened the door for a 
Europe of different speeds and offered to the UK and to Denmark the freedom not to 
participate in the third stage of EMU even if they complied with the economic 
convergence criteria stipulated by the Treaty. Still, it took until the late 1990s, until 
flexibility was – at least to some degree – institutionalised. Finally, in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) the instrument of “enhanced cooperation” was codified in the 
common legal framework in the first and the third pillars, while the Nice Treaty 
facilitated the application of “enhanced cooperation” and extended its scope to the 
second pillar, namely foreign and security policy.  
9.2 Reforming “Enhanced Cooperation”  
This section sets out in more detail how flexibility was planned to be codified in the 
future European legal framework and demonstrates that the provisions on “enhanced 
cooperation” specified in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe are 
insufficient to meet the requirements for club formation within the EU and should be 
reformed in order to become an essential tool of diversity management in the Union.
40   
 
According to the Constitutional Treaty, “enhanced cooperation” refers to the option that 
a number of member states, being willing and capable of advancing further than others 
in deepening distinct policy areas, are enabled to foster the integration process within 
the Union’s institutional framework. Although the prerequisites for making use of the 
possibility of “enhanced cooperation” have already been modified, its requirements are 
still very restrictive and demanding if not prohibitive and seem “apt to preclude most, if 
not all, imaginable forms of closer cooperation” (Weatherill 2000: 11). Thus, even 
though the instrument of “enhanced cooperation” can in theory operate as an adequate 
device to master the increasing heterogeneity of member states, it still displays crucial 
deficiencies and is therefore, as of yet, not likely to become a successful tool for flexible 
integration through club formation.  
 
(1.) While the initial decision to launch “enhanced cooperation” can be essentially 
taken by those willing to cooperate, consequent policy decisions of the 
“cooperation club” are contingent on the relevant provisions of EC law, which 
                                                 
38 That the rise of Europe can be attributed to its diversity resulting in competition among various 
governmental units, which in turn fostered technical, economic and artistic innovation has been observed 
by many philosophers, historians and economists throughout the history of ideas. See Vaubel (2006) for a 
comprehensive survey of the literature.  
39 The Schengen agreement, which was initially signed in 1985 by France, Germany and the Benelux 
countries, pressing ahead to the goal of “open borders”, is a successful example of flexibility of more 
progressive countries pressing ahead to abolish frontier controls. First, the Schengen system operated in a 
formal sense outside the EU system; in 1997 it was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
40 For evaluations of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” see European Constitutional 
Group (2004) or Wohlgemuth (2003). See Warleigh (2002: 53ff) and Berglöf et al. (2003: 73f) for reform 
proposals concerning the provisions on “enhanced cooperation”.    30
in turn implies that there still exists a right to veto in those realms in which the 
Treaties dictate unanimity (Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 29f). 
(2.) The current requirements for “enhanced cooperation”, for example that it has to 
respect “social and territorial cohesion”, must be modified, or at least clarified, 
since they could easily be construed as a barrier to starting “enhanced 
cooperation” should a sufficient number of member states, the Commission or 
the Parliament so choose (Warleigh 2002: 55).  
(3.) Although the possibility for “enhanced cooperation” has been extended to the 
second pillar of the EU, this broadening in scope remains inadequate because in 
this case the right to veto even the launch of “enhanced cooperation” still exists 
(Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 30).  
(4.) Flexibility using the instrument of “enhanced cooperation” remains an 
exception because it can merely be used as a means of last resort (ibid: 30).  
(5.) Even if the last-resort-requirement would be met, the use of “enhanced 
cooperation” is restricted to the creation of relatively large cooperation clubs 
because it has to involve one third of all EU member states.  
(6.) “Enhanced cooperation” can only be applied by national governments and 
differentiated integration involving sub-national jurisdictions is not envisaged 
(ibid: 30).  
(7.) While “enhanced cooperation” allows a sub-group of member states to advance 
further than others, it aims at eventually involving all EU-members as 
participants and thereby causes an inherent tendency to over-centralization in 
rule and policy making.   
 
Moreover, “enhanced cooperation” cannot be applied to existing parts of the acquis. 
Thus, member states cannot unravel their existing commitments in the name of 
flexibility, not even inefficient policies such as the CAP. Another crucial issue is the 
fact that “enhanced cooperation” cannot be used to add new competences to the Union’s 
remit (Warleigh 2002: 55). Thus, much of the potential of flexibility is not likely to be 
tapped via its incarnation as “enhanced cooperation”: despite the fact that EMU shows 
that flexibility can be used to deepen integration and carry with it the great majority of 
member states, currently, the use of flexibility still requires the sanctions of an 
intergovernmental conference and Treaty reform. Much can of course be achieved via 
cooperation under existing policy competences but it is clear that “enhanced 
cooperation” will not be able to allow groups of member states to take the Union in 
radical new directions.  
 
In sum, flexibility is still not adequately institutionalized  and the instrument of 
“enhanced cooperation” as it was reformulated by the Convention and its modifications 
since then – in particular by the heads of state and the heads of government – remains 
insufficiently elaborated and is hardly appropriate to overcome the difficulties of 
increased diversity in a Union with 25 plus x members: Hardly any innovative elements 
and mechanisms in favour of more flexibility and hence problem-solving capacity of 
the European integration process have been incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty. 
Since the current conditions imposed upon flexible integration inside the Treaties 
persist to be strict, “enhanced cooperation” is unlikely to be able to prevent member 
states from embarking upon projects and cooperating outside the treaties and the Union 
institutions.  
 
Therefore, the rules for “enhanced cooperation”ought to be clarified and simplified. 
“Enhanced cooperation” should be allowed in any policy field without the possibility 
of individual outsider countries to veto. Non-club-members should not be allowed to 
interfere with the production of alternative or competing club goods. The Commission 
should only have a (non-exclusive) right of initiative, but neither it nor the Council nor   31
the Parliament should have gate-keeping authority with respect to “enhanced 
cooperation”; on the contrary, individual countries should be allowed to initiate the 
process and to have access to the administrative services of the Commission for that 
purpose (Berglöf et al. 2003: 73f). In addition, the requirement for a certain minimal 
number of members for the launch of “enhanced cooperation” should be reconsidered.  
 
Admitting numerous enhanced cooperation arrangements among subsets of countries or 
even sub-national units by easing the conditions required for such cooperation could 
make flexible forms of integration of the clubs-within-the-club type discussed in this 
paper possible and help overcome the challenges a larger and more diverse Union 
poses. 
10.   A Competitive Order and Meta-institutions for Club Competition  
 
The central aim of this final part is to set out a few basic elements of an institutional 
framework for the successful realisation and operation of flexible integration through 
club formation according to the clubs-within-the-club approach and in order to 
safeguard the competition among these clubs. As with all evolutionary competitive 
processes, the working properties of competition among clubs depend on the nature of 
the “rules of the game” under which it operates. And like market competition, 
institutional competition among clubs can be expected to work to the benefit of the 
persons involved only if it is constrained by appropriate rules (Kerber/Vanberg 1995: 
51ff). If the working properties of competitive processes are to a considerable degree 
contingent on the rules under which they work and if we can ascertain which types of 
rules are more likely than others to make these processes operate as desired by the 
citizens involved, then, it would seem, endeavours to establish and uphold a suitable 
framework of rules should be one of the principal means by which we can hope to 
improve our social condition (ibid.). As a consequence, the emerging consensus that 
more flexible rules for the EU are inevitable brings up the essential question how to 
safeguard the future integration process and how to place the process of club formation 
and club competition within certain clear confines of a competitive order or 
“Wettbewerbsordnung”. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly 
investigate how a suitable competitive order for a European club of clubs could be 
conceptualised and put into practice, we can sketch some suggestions for institutional 
and meta-institutional arrangements, which can at least potentially be more successfully 
and effectively operationalized than at present.
41  
 
As sketched out above, the club-of-clubs approach envisages the European Union to 
consist of numerous overlapping integration clubs around a common core-acquis. 
Membership in the overall “EU-club”, implying the right to representation in all “EU-
club” institutions, would require the adoption of the core-acquis, while EU member 
governments are granted the choice to opt in or out of the policy-specific sub-clubs.
42 
The various policy-specific integration clubs would operate under the EU institutions, 
which could be made use of within each club. As it would not be assured that each EU 
                                                 
41 Of course, the following rough draft, based on Warleigh (2002), is vulnerable to charges of 
fragmentariness, naivety and idealism and is supposed to be merely a basis for discussion. 
42 Warleigh (2002: 91ff.) considers membership in individual policy clubs to be open not only to the 
current EU member states but to any European country. She suggests that non-EU member states would 
have to be admitted to a club by the relevant participant club members, for instance by simple majority 
vote; however, countries from outside the EU would have no say over the creation of a new club.  
The EU budget could be organised as follows (Warleigh 2002: 92): All EU member states are obliged to a 
compulsory contribution to the general EU budget, which finances the “EU-Club” institutions as well as 
the costs of any policies which happen to be agreed upon by all member states, whereas each separate 
policy club would be financed equally by participant states, for example by explicit levy.   32
member state is part of every policy club, the Presidency of the Council would be 
abolished; instead leadership, coordination and an ability to liaise between the member 
states and the various policy clubs could be provided by the Secretary General, whose 
powers and scope of functions would thus be amplified, for instance by heading a 
Council department responsible for liaising between member states in each club and the 
relevant EP committee under co-decision (Warleigh 2002: 93f).  
 
Disputes between members of different clubs could be resolved by the Court of Justice, 
which would also be empowered to warrant that each club follows the rule of EC law 
(ibid: 94). Within a European club of clubs the European Parliament could use its Rules 
of Procedure to make its committees more powerful by granting the relevant committee 
in each policy realm the opportunity to operate as if it were the entire Parliament, 
liaising with both the club member governments and their national parliaments as 
adequate in the context of the respective issue of legislation (ibid: 94). Plenary votes in 
the Parliament would only be required for core-acquis matters or for issues such as 
accession of new member states and the approval of treaty or constitution reforms (ibid: 
95). For the coherence and success of external representation and action of the EU, a 
single voice to express common positions would be a crucial asset. The elaboration of a 
European Security Strategy and the envisaged creation of the new position of Foreign 
Minister point in this direction.  
 
The potential institutional arrangement outlined above would have to be complemented 
by meta-institutions that would form the basis of an order for the “clubs-within-the-
club” concept (Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 38f):  
 
(1.)  One essential element of the order for the club-of-clubs approach may be an 
independent supranational subsidiarity agency, which could administrate the 
competence-competence and supervise the vertical assignment of political 
competencies in the Union (ibid: 38; Feld 2003: 307).  
(2.)  In addition, an anti-trust agency, assuring both political and economic 
competition within the EU and enforcing the club competition order, could 
yield positive effects for inter-jurisdictional competition within the EU 
(Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 38). Possibly, this task could be carried out by the 
Commission: Just as it has rather successfully proceeded against competition 
constraints and misuse of cartel power as “guardian of the treaties”, the 
Commission could presumably protect a club competition order and act as 
“guardian of the club constitutions”. On the other hand, one could consider to 
functionally separating competition policy from the numerous other tasks 
performed by the Commission and instead delegating this task to a specialized 
“European Competition Authority” (Dewatripont et al. 1995; Persson et al. 
1997: 29).  
(3.)  In order to further promote club formation at and below the national level to 
address economic, social, and political problems that show cross-jurisdictional 
externalities, territorial federalism could be complemented by functional 
federalism, through which jurisdictions within a country or across countries 
could cooperate in certain policy fields or execute specific functions 
(Frey/Eichenberger 2000). Under territorial federalism the force of the exit 
option is confined by the costs of geographic mobility; under functional 
federalism, however, assuming all those public services that do not require 
territorial monopolies are separated out from the service-package traditionally 
provided by territorial governments and are provided on a functional basis, 
competing suppliers operate in the same area such that citizens are free to 
choose among competing clubs without the need to move physically from one 
jurisdiction to another.   33
(4.)  In order to institutionally frame and safeguard the process of club creation and 
club functioning, it is a key requirement that policy clubs within the EU 
established on the basis of club constitutions, which, deposited at the 
Commission, transparently regulate club entry and exit as well as voice options 
and help settle potential disputes (Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 38). Constitutional 
regulations should also include provisions to avoid “closed shops” in the 
process of club formation and measures that concern migration between clubs 
as well as tradable club memberships. Once having chosen to join a policy 
club, all club member governments would have to abide by its constitution or 
strive for its reform by agreement among all governments participating in the 
club and, in pillar one, by the relevant committee of the European Parliament 
(Warleigh 2002: 93).  
(5.)  Elements of direct democracy, such as popular initiatives, referenda, and rights 
to file an action could contribute to lowering citizens’ external costs, improve 
political accountability and transparency and encourage civic participation 
(Ahrens/Hoen 2002: 39).
43 They may be applied to supranational, national and 
sub-national jurisdictions – including overlapping policy-specific integration 
clubs – and thereby add to the strength of governance structures of the EU at 
different levels (ibid: 39). According to Frey and Eichenberger (2000: 8), direct 
elections and popular referenda are known to increase efficiency in terms of 
caring well for individual preferences. In addition, with respect to European 
policy clubs, referenda could play an important role in safeguarding against the 
derogation of clubs into cartels (Vaubel 1999). 
 
These institutional arrangements are only examples of a great range of potential 
institutions, which could form the foundation of a European “meta-constitution” that 
grants the choice between different alternative regimes and club constitutions and 
thereby permits not only economic competition between different economic actors but 





The aim of this paper was to find a mode of integration that is capable of coping with 
the challenge of diverse economic structures as well as heterogeneous political, social 
and cultural preferences throughout the EU.  
 
First, Buchanan’s and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent served as a valuable tool in order 
to conceptualise the consequences of growing EU-membership-heterogeneity in terms 
of the costs of collective action in the European Union: the application of the Calculus 
of Consent to the current situation in the EU showed that both external and decision-
making costs increase as a result of the recent enlargement.  
 
Then, the application of the theory of clubs to the EU demonstrated that one single 
overall EU-club providing various club goods to all its members at one single degree of 
integration is sub-optimal from a theoretical point of view. For example, even if it is 
optimal for the EU-25 plus x to have a common foreign and security policy, this does 
not imply that having a currency union for the same countries is efficient; and whether 
or not the formation of a social union in the EU is at all desirable is contingent on very 
different factors than the establishment of a competition union, juridical union, transport 
union and so on.  
                                                 
43 On direct democracy in the EU, see Feld (2003: 297ff), Feld/Kirchgässner (2004) and Frey (2004). 
44 For a discussion of a European competitive order, see also Vaubel (1999).   34
 
Therefore, from the club-theoretic perspective it will be welfare-enhancing to make 
European integration more flexible and allow for the formation of various smaller and 
more homogeneous sub-clubs within the overall EU-club, each with an endogenously 
determined size. Moreover, partitioning the EU-club into multiple, more homogeneous 
sub-clubs eases the trade-off between external and decision-making costs and can be 
expected to reduce external as well as decision-making costs. Thus, both from the 
perspective of Buchanan’s and Tullock’s Calculus as well as from the perspective of the 
theory of clubs, the main conclusion of this paper is that in order to cope with the 
challenge of growing heterogeneity of EU-membership, rules of integration ought to be 
made more flexible.  
 
A fully fledged adaptation of a flexible model of the EU as a club of clubs, for instance 
by reforming the provisions on “enhanced cooperation”, would lead to a net of clubs 
with different tasks and geographical extensions and, as noted above, is likely to put 
strains on the policy and legal coherence of the Union. However, a Union of 25 and 
more countries will only be able to act effectively if its institutional structure accounts 
for the diversity of its members. Moreover, from the view point of constitutional 
economics, transforming the Union into a club of clubs consisting of numerous 
voluntary, overlapping and competing integration clubs around a common core-acquis, 
has the following advantages: Competition among clubs increases politicians’ 
responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and can help determine which European goods 
and services best serve the common interest of which European citizens by operating as 
knowledge-creating “discovery procedure” and allowing for consecutive and parallel 
experimenting with different forms of integration. 
 
The concept of functionally overlapping clubs put forward in this paper may as of yet 
seem too abstract to meet with any broad acceptance in the current real world of 
politics. Public Choice Theory provides a number of possible explanations for this, all 
of which boil down to the fact that politicians and bureaucrats are primarily involved in 
reaching their own goals, and these do not harmonize with the competitive principles of 
club-of-clubs integration (Schäfer 1995: 60).  
 
However, the EU is bound to change its integration rules as expansion has taken place 
and the challenges of increased heterogeneity present an outstanding prospect to return 
to sober-minded solutions, including overdue reforms, and to provide Europe as a whole 
with a structure which is economically and politically viable. In the course of changing 
European integration rules, flexibility should be explicitly developed as a principle of 
governance that ought to be implemented in a rule-based and transparent manner and 
under the scrutiny of common institutions. This, however, can only be achieved if a 
clear model of flexibility is formulated and the provisions for “enhanced cooperation” 
undergo reform. Further investigations are required to explore ways in which flexible 
integration could be implemented and how flexibility could be institutionally framed in 
order to circumvent a rank growth of European integration by establishing incentive-
compatible institutions that align the personal interests of policy makers and the 
common interest that they are supposed to pursue.  
   35
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TABLE 1: ECONOMIC HETEROGENEITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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Cyprus  83,1  5,3 2,0 NA 0,7 
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Estonia  57,4  7,9 4,1 6,1 1,3 
Hungary  60,9  7,2 3,5 5,8 10,1 
Latvia  47,1  8,9 6,9 13,4  2,3 
Lithuania  52,1  8,3 2,7 17,8  3,4 
Malta  69,3  7,3 2,5 NA 0,4 
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